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Abstract
Combining effective security and usability is often
considered impossible. For example, deploying effective
security for wireless networks is a difﬁcult task, even for
skilled systems administrators – a fact that is impeding
the deployment of many mobile systems.
In this paper we describe a system that lets typical
users easily build a highly secure wireless network. Our
main contribution is to show how gesture-based user in-
terfaces can be applied to provide a complete solution
for securing wireless networks. This allows users to in-
tuitively manage the network security of their mobile de-
vices, even those with limited user interfaces. We demon-
strate through user studies that our secure implementa-
tion is considerably easier to use than typical commer-
cially available options, even those that provide lower
security. Our gesture-based approach is quite general,
and can be used to design a wide variety of systems that
are simultaneously secure and easy to administer.
1 Introduction
Connecting mobile computers together in a wireless
network can be largely automated. Today, many default
networking conﬁgurations allow computers to connect to
any wireless access point, to obtain IP addresses, gate-
way information and DNS server locations automatically
through DHCP, etc. Mobility of devices makes this auto-
conﬁguration a necessity: when devices are removed
from one environment and introduced into another, users
should not be burdened with reconﬁguring their devices
manually.
This situation, however, shifts dramatically when we
require our wireless network to be secure. A secure
wireless network only admits certain (authorized) de-
vices, and protects those devices and their communi-
cation from attack. Today, securing a wireless (or in-
deed, any) network usually requires substantial amounts
of manual work. The burden placed on the user ranges
from specifying passwords for access points and clients
to managing a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), complete
with setting up a certiﬁcation authority, issuing certiﬁ-
cates and installing them on client computers, conﬁgur-
ing client security, etc. The more secure the network, the
more complex the conﬁguration. This means that strong
wireless security solutions are often completely out of
reach for typical end users.
The difﬁculties of deploying secure wireless networks
is perceived as just one example of the general tension
betweensecurityandusability, whichhasledmanytobe-
lieve that there is an unresolvable trade-off between the
two. The tension between security and ease of network
conﬁguration signiﬁcantly adds to the cost of setting up
and maintaining secure networks. This is aggravated in
wireless networks, where the lack of physical barriers to
access makes strong network security crucial. Consider,
for example, a company that has an Ethernet-based in-
tranet that can only be accessed from inside the company
building, while the 802.11-based wireless network can
be accessed from the public parking lot across the street.
In this paper, we show that security and ease of net-
work conﬁguration do not, in fact, have to be at odds
with each other. We describe a method to set up a se-
cure wireless network without any manual conﬁguration.
We solve the problem of introducing wireless devices to
the network, distributing initial keys between them and
pieces of the network infrastructure (e.g., access points)
– and thus establishing trust – by using location-limited
channels [5]. As a result, a user can add a laptop to a se-
cure wireless network by walking up to an access point
and physically pointing out the access point to his laptop.
Thelaptopandtheaccesspointexchangepublickeysand
other relevant information through the location-limited
channel, before proceeding with a completely automatedFigure 1. Connecting a laptop to a secured wireless network in 32 seconds. All the user has to
do is brieﬂy align the infrared ports of laptop and access point and press the Enter key twice.
These are snapshots from a live Network-in-a-Box demonstration.
conﬁguration of the laptop. This includes conﬁguration
of the network security settings (as well as more tradi-
tional conﬁgurations such as IP addresses, gateway in-
formation, etc.).
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we de-
signed and built a secure wireless access point and con-
ﬁguration software for mobile devices. Our gesture-
based interface reduced the time needed for a user to en-
roll a laptop into a secure wireless network from over
9 minutes to under 60 seconds. At the same time, we
increased the security of that network from (rather inse-
cure) WEP to 802.1x EAP-TLS [17]. Our technology
makes it possible for mobile devices to be conﬁgured
quickly and to easily move to new secure networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 5 we describe related work. In Section 2, we present
background information on gesture-based authentication
and wireless security protocols necessary to understand
the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we present the de-
sign and implementation of an easy-to-use secure wire-
less network consisting of a single “smart” access point.
We have experimentally demonstrated the usability of
this system, with results shown in Section 3.4. In Sec-
tion 4 we show how to extend our approach to conﬁgur-
inglargeenterprisewirelessnetworksconsistingofmany
commercial off-the-shelf access points. We conclude in
Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Gesture-Directed Automatic Conﬁguration
Authentication is the most basic security problem
faced by mobile networked devices: once two devices
can securely recognize each other, they can then se-
curely exchange data, set network conﬁgurations, issue
credentials, and so on. Traditional approaches to this
problem assume that both devices already participate
in some manually-conﬁgured shared infrastructure, for
example, that they have been conﬁgured with identical
passphrases, each other’s public key, or the public key
of a common certiﬁcation authority. For mobile devices,
and new consumer devices brought into the home, this
will not be the case. We need a way to allow two de-
vices to communicate securely with each other even if
they know nothing about each other a priori.
We solve this problem in a simple, easy-to-use man-
ner. A user wishing to initiate communication be-
tween his device and another device in the area simply
“points out” his desired communication partner, using a
location-limited channel [5] – e.g., touching the two de-
vices together, or indicating the desired target using in-
frared, as with a remote control. With this simple and
intuitive gesture, the user actually sends a small amount
of conﬁguration and cryptographic information – ﬁnger-
prints of public keys – across this more trusted channel,
and the target device sends a small amount of informa-
tion back. This allows those two devices then to authen-
ticate each other and communicate securely over the net-
work.
Therearemanytypesoflocation-limitedchannels. As
wearesendingonlypublicinformationoverthischannel,
we require of such a channel only that it be very difﬁcult
for an attacker to transmit information in that channel
without being detected; the channel need not be intrin-
sically “private” or impervious to eavesdropping. Chan-
nels such as infrared or contact give a strong intuitive
feeling of “pointing out”. A simple, passive USB stor-
age token can be used to exchange authentication infor-
mation between less mobile devices in a location-limited
way. Audio channels allow the exchange of authentica-
tion information between a number of devices at once,
thus enabling secure group communication [5, 24]. The
work presented here builds on infrared location-limited
channels.
Location-limited channels often have lower band-
width and higher latency than typical network media, so
both the amount of data exchanged and the number of
rounds of communication must be kept to a minimum.
In the work presented here, two devices exchange cryp-
tographic digests of their public keys over the location-
limited channel, plus a small amount of network infor-mation. Subsequent communication takes place over the
less secure (wireless) network, and is secured using stan-
dard public key protocols, where trust in the public keys
is established by matching their cryptographic digests
with those received on the location-limited channel. This
allows the creation of a secure tunnel in which any num-
ber of rounds of more bandwidth-intensive network con-
ﬁguration and network provisioning protocols can be ex-
ecuted, such as protocols for requesting and delivering
digital certiﬁcates.
This gesture-based approach to authentication sup-
ports a variety of trust models. Participants can be con-
ﬁgured to allow only the last party with whom they per-
formed a location-limited exchange, to set up a secure,
authenticated network connection to them; or the trust
established through the location-limited exchange may
“expire” in a short amount of time, as appropriate for the
application.
In summary, a user gesture brieﬂy establishes a
location-limited channel, which in turn allows software
to bootstrap a secure tunnel for the provisioning and au-
tomatic installation of network and security conﬁgura-
tion information. We refer to this process as gesture-
directed automatic conﬁguration.
2.2 Wireless Security Protocols
The most popular standard for wireless networks is
IEEE 802.11.1 Adoption of 802.11 wireless networks
for critical applications has been hampered by high-
proﬁlereportsofsecurityﬂaws. Thesecurityandencryp-
tion component of the original 802.11 standard, WEP
(“Wired Equivalent Privacy”), requires clients and access
points to share a single secret passphrase or key which
they use to encrypt all wireless trafﬁc. Unfortunately,
highly-publicized attacks on WEP [7, 11, 36] have com-
pletely discredited WEP as an effective security mecha-
nism.
To address these problems, industry and standards
bodies are proposing new security protocols for 802.11,
which will appear over the next few years. These pro-
tocols – “Wi-Fi Protected Access” (WPA [2]) and the
802.11i standard [18] combine use of an existing stan-
dard protocol, 802.1x [17] which is used to authenticate
devices and users wishing to join the wireless network,
with the ability to automatically derive and update en-
cryption keys to secure wireless data. These protocols
differ primarily in how the data is encrypted with these
keys, and provide different degrees of backward com-
patibility with deployed hardware. The 802.11i standard
1802.11 comes in a variety of subtypes with differing frequency
and bandwidth characteristics. Although the implementation discussed
here uses only 802.11b, all results are general and apply equally well
to 802.11a, 802.11g, etc..
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Figure 2. Roles and message ﬂows with
802.1x authentication using the EAP-TLS
protocol.
is intended as the ﬁnal standard for security in 802.11
wirelessnetworks, whileWPAisintendedasatemporary
backward-compatible intermediate step, and is based on
a draft of 802.11i.
The core of these two protocols – 802.1x-based au-
thentication combined with automatic frequent update of
the keys used to secure wireless data – has begun to see
widespread use in advance of WPA and 802.11i deploy-
ment. As 802.1x is currently the most secure available
option to transparently secure an 802.11 wireless LANs,
we chose it for our implementation. As our work focuses
on conﬁguring trust for the 802.1x authentication proto-
col common to all three, our results immediately gener-
alize to both WPA and 802.11i. In fact, our approach
generalizes to allow easy conﬁguration of IPsec-based
wireless LAN security (see Section 3.2.2), or any other
security mechanism authenticated using a Public Key In-
frastructure.
The 802.1x Protocol. The 802.1x security stan-
dard [17] deﬁnes a mechanism for providing access con-
trol for any IEEE 802 LAN, including 802.11 wireless
networks. In an 802.1x-compliant wireless network (as
shown in Figure 2), each access point plays the role of an
authenticator forcing every client to authenticate before
allowingaccesstothewirelessnetwork. Priortosuccess-
ful authentication, a client may only send 802.1x proto-
col messages to the access point (AP); it is not allowed
to send any data frames. The access point itself is not ca-
pable of making any authentication decisions. Instead, it
forwards all 802.1x messages from the client to a back-
end authentication server (AS) via the RADIUS [31]
protocol; the AS checks the credentials of the client and
indicates to the access point whether the client is autho-
rized to access the network. Optionally, the AS providesthe AP information which allows it to securely transmit
uniqueshort-liveddataencryptionkeystoeachclient[8].
This latter step is used in the wireless context to protect
client data transmitted over the air.
The 802.1x protocol is “pluggable”, allowing any one
of a wide number of authentication protocols to be run
under the wrapper it uses – EAP, the Extensible Au-
thentication Protocol [6]. The most secure of these is
EAP-TLS [1], a wrapper around the widely deployed
TLS (SSL) key exchange protocol [9], which requires
all wireless clients and the network infrastructure itself
to use digital certiﬁcates for authentication. Keying ma-
terial exchanged as part of this TLS handshake is then
used to automatically give authenticated clients encryp-
tion keys that they can use to secure their trafﬁc on the
wireless network. These keys are updated frequently
without human intervention.
Current 802.1x deployments frequently opt for
password- or shared secret-based authentication options,
in order to avoid the difﬁculty of issuing a digital cer-
tiﬁcates to each client device. However, in addition to
its greater security, EAP-TLS has a number of desirable
features. First, as every client (and the authentication
server) possesses a unique digital certiﬁcate and corre-
sponding private key, access for individual clients can be
revokedincaseofcompromise; incontrast, shared-secret
variants of EAP [6] require client machines to be rekeyed
en masse whenever the compromise of a single machine
occurs. Password-based EAP protocols are subject to
the same password-guessing attacks as other password-
based systems [32], and can additionally be subject to
man-in-the-middle attacks [4]. Furthermore, digital cer-
tiﬁcates and private keys are usually stored on disk pro-
tected by both the operating system and the user’s pass-
word; they are unlocked as soon as a user logs into a
machine. This provides quick, frequent and automatic
authentication of both the user and the device, desirable
for security and to allow seamless roaming. This approx-
imates more closely a single sign-on system than does a
password-based authentication method, where reauthen-
tication requires caching or frequent re-entry of the pass-
word.
Once a digital certiﬁcate and other conﬁguration in-
formation has been installed on every client, an 802.1x-
secured wireless network using EAP-TLS is extremely
easy to use – it requires no user intervention. The clients
(and the authentication server) use their certiﬁcates and
corresponding private keys to authenticate themselves to
each other, requiring no input from the user.
Unfortunately, it is the process of enrolling every de-
vice in a common PKI – provisioning the digital certiﬁ-
cates – that is a daunting task for system administrators,
and out of reach of typical end users. In our organization,
for instance, the process of setting up a PKI for use with
802.1x/EAP-TLS required each user, for each device, to
follow a minimum of thirty-eight separate documented
steps, requiring several hours of end-user time over two
days. Theseconsistofusingaverytypicalweb-baseden-
rollment interface to request a certiﬁcate, and then con-
ﬁguring Microsoft’s standard 802.1x client to securely
access a particular wireless network.
Clearly, a much simpler solution would not only be
theoretically interesting, but practically useful. In the
next section, we describe how to apply gesture-directed
automatic conﬁguration to simplify setting up a secure
wireless network consisting of a single access point; in
Section 4, we describe our solution for an enterprise-
scale wireless network.
3 A “Network-in-a-Box”
Our “Network-in-a-Box” consists of a custom-built
wireless access point (NiaB AP), providing a complete
802.1x-secured wireless network, and software for client
devices to enroll in that network. After a gesture-directed
automatic conﬁguration step (during which users point
their device at the access point), client devices are fully
conﬁgured to participate in the wireless network.
Duringthisprocess, theaccesspointissuesdigitalcer-
tiﬁcates for use in the EAP-TLS-based wireless security
system. The user is managing a small PKI without even
realizing it. Instead of burdening the user with compli-
cated certiﬁcate management semantics, we provide a
simple and intuitive security model: A device can par-
ticipate in the wireless network if and only if, during en-
rollment, it can be brought into close physical proximity
of the access point. For example, if a NiaB AP were to
be deployed in a home, then someone wishing to gain
access to its wireless network would have to be able to
physically enter that home. (Especially concerned users
might even lock their NiaB AP in a closet.) This is a
simple, intuitive trust model that seems quite effective
for many situations.
3.1 User Experience
Imagine a user who wants to set up a secure wireless
network to use with his laptop. Our user starts by bring-
ing home a new NiaB AP (our prototype NiaB AP is the
small white box shown in Figure 1). When he plugs it
in for the ﬁrst time, it initializes itself and autoconﬁgures
the network services it will provide.
To add his laptop to the NiaB network, the user starts
a NiaB enrollment application on that laptop. The ap-
plication can be either pre-installed by the laptop ven-
dor, or provided with the NiaB AP.2 The enrollment soft-
ware (shown in Figure 3) asks the user to “point out”
2If a USB token is used to exchange authentication information (seeFigure 3. Screenshots from the Network-in-a-Box client software for Microsoft Windows XPTM.
the NiaB AP whose network he wishes to join. In our
implementation, he does this using the infrared port on
his laptop. For a second or two, the devices exchange
a small amount of information over infrared; then, the
user is prompted to separate the devices to continue the
automatic conﬁguration of the laptop. After a few more
seconds, the user is informed that his laptop is ready to
use. These simple steps provide a previously unconﬁg-
ured laptop with everything needed to get a “network
dial-tone”.
If the user later wants to add his laptop to another se-
cure network, he simply runs the client software again.
As the client application contains no pre-conﬁgured in-
formation about a particular network, instead getting all
the information it needs about whom to trust and what
network to join via the infrared exchange, it can be
used repeatedly to conﬁgure the same laptop for mul-
tiple secure networks. Once credential information for
each network of interest has been conﬁgured, the user
can switch between them “on the ﬂy” using whatever
location-management facilities his operating system pro-
vides. For example, our Windows XP-based implemen-
tation targets the built-in “Wireless Zero Conﬁg” service,
which automatically switches between conﬁgured wire-
less networks as the laptop moves around, without re-
quiring any user intervention.
3.2 System Design
As described in Section 2, an 802.1x-based wireless
network contains a number of components: one or more
access points, an authentication server making determi-
nations about what clients are allowed to access the net-
work, and, in the case of EAP-TLS, a certiﬁcation au-
thority, which issues certiﬁcates. As shown in Figure 4,
our NiaB AP contains all three of these components, as
well as general system services such as DHCP and a ﬁre-
wall, and a http-based management interface. It is there-
Section 2.1), it can also be used to install the software.
fore able to provide EAP-TLS-secured network access to
clients without requiring other network components. The
NiaB AP also contains a novel component – an “enroll-
ment station”. This component is responsible for han-
dling requests for automatic client conﬁguration made
over location-limited channels like infrared or USB.
System Initialization. When the NiaB AP is switched
on for the ﬁrst time, the access point component auto-
matically chooses itself a wireless network name and
channel. (The network name is “NiaB Network +
<number>”, where the number is chosen randomly be-
tween 1 and 1000 to keep your NiaB AP from inter-
fering with your neighbor’s.) The certiﬁcation author-
ity component generates a root key pair and root certiﬁ-
cate. By default, the NiaB AP will request its own IP ad-
dress through DHCP, while providing IP addresses for its
clients through DHCP from a non-routable address pool.
If the NiaB AP does not have an external connection to
the Internet, it still provides a useful wireless network to
its clients, allowing a group of users to easily conﬁgure a
secure local wireless network.
We also built in a reset feature to return a NiaB AP to
a “new” state. The reset feature is activated by pressing a
(physical) button on the device. Upon reset, the NiaB AP
disconnects and removes all records of existing clients.
It generates a new network name, root key pair, and root
certiﬁcate. This automatically invalidates the certiﬁcates
of previous clients, as they are signed by the old root key,
rather than the new one.
Device Enrollment. When a user initiates enrollment
by executing our enrollment software on a client com-
puter, the software performs a number of steps. First, it
creates a cryptographic key pair, which consists of a pri-
vate key that will remain encrypted on his computer, and
a public key that eventually (as described below) will be
encapsulated in a digital certiﬁcate for use in authenticat-
ing to the network.laptop with NiaB
enrollment software
NiaB AP
• 802.11 Access Point
• Enrollment Station
• Certification Authority
• Authentication Server
Figure 4. The Network-in-a-Box provides the functionality of several network components.
When the user makes the temporary infrared connec-
tion, his computer and the NiaB AP exchange what we
call preauthentication information: the enrollment sta-
tion component in the NiaB AP sends the name of its
wireless network (802.11 SSID) along with the SHA-1
digest of its public key to the user’s computer. The user’s
computer responds with a the SHA-1 digest of its (newly
created) public key.
Since the user’s computer now knows the wireless
network name, it can contact the NiaB AP over the
higher-bandwidth 802.11 network, and the infrared con-
nection between the two devices is no longer necessary.
Next, the enrollment station component on the NiaB
AP and NiaB enrollment software on the user’s computer
run EAP-PTLS over the wireless link. EAP-PTLS is an
EAP plug-in protocol we designed speciﬁcally for pro-
visioning network access for NiaB client computers, and
is described in greater detail in Section 3.2.1. At this
point the NiaB AP disregards all trafﬁc from the client
computer except for EAP messages, as required by the
802.1x protocol (see Section 2.2).
The EAP-PTLS exchange encapsulates a TLS hand-
shake, in which the client computer and the NiaB AP
present each other their full public keys and prove that
they possess the corresponding private keys. The public
keys are automatically checked to make sure they match
the digital ﬁngerprints previously exchanged over the in-
frared location-limited channel, allowing the client and
NiaB AP to authenticate each other. The AP can conﬁrm
that the client performing the EAP-PTLS handshake over
the wireless network was indeed physically present at the
NiaB AP earlier, and the client can be sure it is talking to
the AP of interest.
Once the TLS tunnel has been established via EAP-
PTLS, the enrollment software sends a certiﬁcate request
to the NiaB AP through this tunnel. The enrollment sta-
tion component passes this request on to the certiﬁca-
tion authority component, which creates a certiﬁcate for
the client and returns it over the TLS connection. The
enrollment software on the user’s computer installs the
new certiﬁcate, and automatically conﬁgures the laptop’s
802.1x security client software to use it.
Using the Network. At this point, the laptop has ev-
erything it needs to participate fully in the secure wire-
less network. Normal authentication occurs via an
802.1x authentication protocol exchange with the au-
thentication server component on the NiaB AP. Since the
client computer has just been conﬁgured with a digital
certiﬁcate, it is able to use EAP-TLS to authenticate to
the wireless network. This is the ﬁnal “steady-state” for
theclient, requiringonlystandard802.1xclientsoftware;
our enrollment software is no longer needed and can be
either removed from the client computer, or used again
at a later point to add the laptop to additional secure net-
works.
Once the lower-level 802.1x authentication succeeds,
higher-level network provisioning takes place: The
DHCPserverontheNiaBAPassignsanIPaddresstothe
client computer, along with addresses of DNS servers,
IP gateways (both, in fact, pointing to the NiaB AP), etc.
Again, wedon’tprovideanyspecialsoftwareforthisstep
on the client side, and instead rely on standard software
built into the operating systems of the client computers.
3.2.1 EAP-PTLS Protocol
The EAP-PTLS protocol is a simple variant of the stan-
dard EAP-TLS authentication protocol [1]. Like EAP-
TLS, the wireless client and authentication server (in this
case, the NiaB AP itself) perform a standard TLS ex-
change: exchanging certiﬁcates, demonstrating that they
each possess the private key corresponding to the public
key in thatcertiﬁcate, and establishinga secure tunnel for
further communication. However, in the case of EAP-
PTLS, the certiﬁcates used are self-signed, and are sim-
ply carriers for the public keys whose ﬁngerprints were
previously exchanged over the location-limited chan-
nel. Both the client and server are satisﬁed with the
authentication exchange only when, at the conclusion
of a successful TLS handshake, the key used by each
party matches the ﬁngerprint previously received over
the location-limited channel.
In EAP-TLS, the TLS handshake is only used for au-
thentication and for agreement on keying material that is
used to derive keys to protect future wireless trafﬁc. No
data is actually sent down the secure tunnel. In EAP-PTLS, we do send data over the secure TLS tunnel. We
use the Certiﬁcate Management Protocol (CMP) [3], a
standard protocol for requesting and retrieving certiﬁ-
cates, to allow the new client to send a certiﬁcate request
to the authentication server through this tunnel. This re-
quest is forwarded to a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) in-
ternal to the NiaB and immediately approved and signed
by the root key in the NiaB. Although the design choice
of using CMP may seem like overkill in this scenario (the
internal NiaB CA always approves incoming certiﬁcate
requests), it allows us to easily generalize our solution to
the enterprise scenario described in Section 4.
3.2.2 “Phone Home” Service
Our solution for provisioning 802.1x-based security gen-
eralizeswelltoothersecurityapplicationssuchasVirtual
Private Networks (VPNs). Consider a user who has suc-
cessfully conﬁgured a home network, and then wishes
to access the devices and services on that network while
he is away from home. This is a feature not typically
provided by consumer home gateway devices. A more
sophisticated gateway device or ﬁrewall machine might
allow the user to conﬁgure a password-based approach to
providing remote access to his home; access to which is
often not encrypted.
We added features to the NiaB AP to make it easy to
allowdevicestoaccessthehomenetworkusinganIPsec-
based VPN. This VPN uses the same certiﬁcate as was
issued by the NiaB AP when the device enrolled in the
home network. We have implemented automatic conﬁg-
uration of such a service, which we call “Phone Home”,
as part of our Windows XPTM NiaB client enrollment
software. The Phone Home service is set up at the same
time as the enrollment in the wireless network, requiring
no additional effort from the user.
As part of device enrollment, the NiaB enrollment
software conﬁgures appropriate IPsec policies and Re-
mote Access Service (RAS) Phonebook entries to allow
the client computer to initiate a standard Windows-style
L2TP-based IPsec VPN connection back to the external
IP address of the enrolling NiaB [38]. This new “Phone
Home” VPN connection appears as a standard “Network
Connection” on the user’s desktop. Clicking on it moves
their machine virtually “inside” their home network in a
secure fashion. All communication with the home net-
work is encrypted and authenticated, and the remote de-
vice automatically receives a new, “virtual” IP address
inside the home network’s address space. All commu-
nication now goes through the ﬁrewall provided by the
NiaB.
Provisioning and access to the “phone home” service
is controlled using the NiaB management interface (see
Section 3.2.3 below). Although clients are conﬁgured to
be able to use the service by default, such access can be
disabled on a client-by-client basis at the NiaB, indepen-
dent of the access those clients have to the NiaB’s local
wireless network. This is useful, for example, in the case
where a home user decides that a guest may get access
to the wireless network, but should not have access to
network resources from outside of the home.
3.2.3 System Management and Client Revocation
In order to allow the user to monitor the status of his
NiaB system, alter any of the autoconﬁguration parame-
ters inappropriate for his situation (e.g., to turn on PPPoE
if his ISP requires it, or to conﬁgure a static IP address
for the external interface of the NiaB AP), we provide
a simple web-server based management interface. This
interface is largely similar to that provided by standard
commercial access points, though is easier for users to
ﬁnd, and does not require the use of a password for se-
cure access.
Through the NiaB’s DNS proxy (conﬁgured to be the
DNS server for all NiaB clients), we redirect any entries
in the “.niab” domain to the NiaB AP itself. Therefore,
entering “http://www.niab” in a web browser automati-
cally takes you to the NiaB management page, without
requiring the user to enter a speciﬁc conﬁguration IP ad-
dress. A shortcut to this page is provided as part of client
conﬁguration. Since individual NiaB clients can be rec-
ognized by their certiﬁcates, policy conﬁguration can be
used to allow only a subset of those clients to access
the NiaB management interface (e.g., the ﬁrst client to
join the network, and any other clients he speciﬁcally en-
ables). This use of client authentication to control access
also saves the user from having to change and remember
an administrator password.
Most importantly, this conﬁguration interface allows
a user to permanently revoke access to NiaB services
(wireless network and VPN) to any client, by revoking
that client’s certiﬁcate – this is done simply by clicking a
button in the management interface next to the name of
the device to be removed from the network. At that point,
a new Certiﬁcate Revocation List is automatically gener-
ated by the NiaB AP, and all currently-connected clients
are asked to reauthenticate. To temporarily restrict client
access, the management interface allows wireless and
VPN access to be separately enabled and disabled for
each enrolled client. While this interface may not be as
directly intuitive as our gesture-directed enrollment in-
terface, it does provide useful functionality – revocation
of individual devices. We have not yet experimentally
studied how usable this simple interface is, but we may
explore more intuitive alternatives in future work.3.3 Implementation Details
3.3.1 NiaB Access Point
We have implemented our NiaB access point on the
OpenBrick platform [13] – a small, x86-based computer
providing most of the ports and peripherals standard to
larger PCs. We have modiﬁed the hardware to add an in-
frared port to the front of each device, along with a red
LED that is used to inform the user when the NiaB AP is
transmitting infrared data. This LED provides valuable
feedback to the user as to whether they have lined the
device infrared ports up properly.
The NiaB access points are running a modiﬁed dis-
tribution of RedHat Linux 9.0, and release 2.6.4 of the
Linux kernel. This version was selected for its greater
stability and for its native support for IPsec. The Linux
kernel provides native ﬁrewalling capabilities, which we
conﬁgure to provide protection from the Internet for the
hosts on the NiaB-provided wireless network. The NiaB
access points also act as DHCP servers and DNS caches
for their clients.
Implementations of our base protocols – gesture-
directed authentication using location-limited channels,
the EAP-PTLS enrollment protocol, certiﬁcate issuance
functions, and Certiﬁcate Management Protocol (CMP)
messaging used to request certiﬁcates, etc., are written
as libraries in C++ to facilitate reuse. All cryptographic
operations are implemented using OpenSSL 0.9.7.
Access point functionality for the NiaB access points
is provided using the HostAP project’s access point soft-
ware [29], slightly modiﬁed to provide the additional
logging and management interfaces we require. We set
up the HostAP access point software to be a 802.1x
passthrough to an internal RADIUS server for authen-
tication decisions (see Figure 4).
The RADIUS server we use is a modiﬁed version of
FreeRADIUS 0.8.1 [28]. FreeRADIUS itself provides
a pluggable implementation of the EAP protocol archi-
tecture, making it easy to add implementations of new
EAP subtypes. We use that architecture to add a C++
implementation of EAP-PTLS (see Section 3.2.1). We
modiﬁed the implementation of EAP-TLS provided by
FreeRADIUS to add additional conﬁguration and sup-
port for the use of Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists (CRLs),
and to access the client authentication information con-
trolled through our management interface.
To provide “phone home” functionality, we use the
IPsec support present in the Linux kernel (version 2.6),
and modiﬁed a version of the IKE daemon raccoon to
check both CRLs and our client authentication informa-
tion database to verify clients.
Our management interface is provided using
mini httpd 1.17 [33], a small web server, chroot’ed for
greater protection, coupled with a variety of Perl and
Python scripts. Standalone certiﬁcation authority and
CRL generation functionality is implemented in a C++
library which uses OpenSSL to handle cryptographic
operations and certiﬁcate and CRL formatting.
3.3.2 NiaB Client Software
The client application described above is implemented
for Microsoft Windows XPTM, and has been tested suc-
cessfully on a wide variety of laptop hardware using a
number of different 802.11 client cards, both internal
and external. A command-line client for Linux has been
tested on a somewhat smaller range of laptop hardware.
We implemented client-side protocols and routines
for CMP, EAP-PTLS, location-limited channels, and cer-
tiﬁcate handling as portable libraries written in C++.
All cryptographic operations are implemented using
OpenSSL 0.9.7.
To support frame handling for sending and re-
ceiving raw Ethernet packets (necessary for executing
EAP-PTLS over the wireless connection), we use the
NDISUIO API [34] for Microsoft WindowsTM and libd-
net [22] and libpcap [23] for Linux. The user inter-
face of our Microsoft WindowsTM uses Microsoft Foun-
dation Classes. For basic wireless support, we use
the NDISUIO API for the Microsoft Windows XPTM
client, and the Linux Wireless Extension and Wireless
Tools [12] for Linux. Our NiaB client software sets up
802.1x support for Windows XPTM using the Wireless
Zero Conﬁguration Service [16] and for Linux using the
xsupplicant 802.1x client software package [27].
Again, our software is used only when a client is en-
rolling in a new wireless network and does not inter-
fere with the normal day-to-day use of such networks.
Though our software supports being used repeatedly to
add the client device to more than one secure wireless
networks, switching between those networks in opera-
tion is then done using the mechanisms provided by the
operating system in use.
3.4 User Studies
We undertook a series of usability studies [10] both
to test if our system actually makes it easier to set up a
secure wireless network, and to obtain feedback to itera-
tively improve our design.
3.4.1 Procedure
Our usability tests had two objectives. First, we wanted
to know whether our system, NiaB, allowed users to eas-
ily and securely connect to a wireless network. Our sec-
ond objective was to compare our solution against a com-Commercial AP NiaB
Time (min) Steps Time (min) Steps
Avg 9:39 14 0:51 2
Ease Satisfaction Conﬁdence Ease Satisfaction Conﬁdence
Avg 33 211 1
Table 1. User studies comparing the stand-alone Network-in-a-Box to a commercial access
point.
mercially available alternative. We picked a commer-
cially available access point based on several criteria:
it should be designed for end users, not enterprises; it
should be a market leader; and, enrollment should occur
on the same operating system as our solution (to avoid
confounding variables by switching platforms).
Usability tests assign tasks to users to see whether
they can complete them successfully and to learn what
errors they make. The task we chose was to ask a user to
connect a laptop to a secure wireless network. Though
practical deployments of our client software were done
on a wide variety of laptop hardware and wireless net-
work cards, we asked all participants to use the same
laptop in order to limit setup time and variability in our
quantitativestudies. Thelaptopcamepre-loadedwiththe
setup software for both NiaB and the commercial AP. In
both cases, the setup software provided a “wizard”-style
interface for the user. The commercial AP’s wizard re-
quired 10 steps, the NiaB’s wizard required two (each
stage in the connection process where the user has to
make a decision was counted as a step).
Subjects were asked to connect to both access points,
one after the other. Users were timed how long it took
them to complete each connection task. We also counted
how many errors they made and how many steps they
took.
We selected our subjects from a pool of our co-
workers. To avoid a bias in our data towards people with
signiﬁcant computer science skills we recruited broadly
from both the research and administrative staff. Further,
we administered a screening questionnaire to ensure that
we selected subjects with a broad range of backgrounds.
We screened for education (technical vs. non-technical)
and experience (wireless network owned and adminis-
tered, no wireless network and never set up). We selected
the broad range of subjects to avoid an emphasis towards
reduced times (for both the commercial and NiaB AP)
that would derive from either educational background or
experience with wireless networking technologies.
To avoid potential learning bias (being able to connect
more quickly the second time than the ﬁrst based on new
knowledge) we selected an even number of participants,
split them into two groups, one of which connected to the
NiaB AP and then the commercial AP and the other who
connected to the commercial AP and then the NiaB AP.
After each connection activity participants were asked to
rate their experience in terms of ease, satisfaction, and
conﬁdence.
Our testing was done in two iterations. We recruited
six subjects for the ﬁrst iteration. We picked six sub-
jects because previous research shows that ﬁve subjects
reveal approximately 80% of the usability errors in a sys-
tem [26]. In addition to comparing the commercial AP
and NiaB, the ﬁrst iteration was also used to reﬁne the
NiaB user interface. In the second iteration subjects eval-
uated a revised NiaB interface using the same task as the
ﬁrst iteration. By keeping the task design the same we
were able to compare across the two studies, and the re-
sults from the second iteration increased our chances of
ﬁnding almost all of the usability errors.
3.4.2 Results
The results from the two iterations are shown in Ta-
ble 1. They show that users took much less time (approx-
imately a 10x speed-up) on average to connect to NiaB
AP than the commercial AP. NiaB also required fewer
steps – points where the user has to make decisions –
than the commercial AP. More signiﬁcantly, on average
users took two steps to join the NiaB network, the same
number needed to enroll correctly. This was not true for
the commercial AP, for which users took an average of
14 steps – 4 more than intended. In other words, users
were making errors in the set up process for the commer-
cial AP and frequently having to repeat steps and recover
from mistakes.
The likelihood of making errors and the number of
steps involved in the commercial AP set up task con-
tributed to users ratings of ease, satisfaction, and con-
ﬁdence. On scales of 1 (most positive) to 5 (most neg-
ative) users rated ease of task, satisfaction in the expe-
rience, and conﬁdence that they could do it again, more
highly for NiaB. These positive feelings towards NiaB
were borne out in qualitative interviews, too.
One advantage that iterative usability testing offers isthe opportunity to identify and ﬁx problems with the in-
terface. Theﬁrstiterationuncoveredtwousabilityissues.
First, although people managed to successfully use the
location-limited channel, they did not realize that they
could move the laptop away from the access point once
theinitialdatawasexchanged. Second, peopledidnotal-
ways know when they had actually ﬁnished the task and
could use the network. These ﬁndings allowed us to re-
designtheinterface, andretestitwithusers. Resultsfrom
our second iteration show that we provided more appro-
priate feedback to let users know to unalign the infrared
ports after the location-limited data exchange, and com-
municated more effectively when they were completely
ﬁnished.
4 Securing Enterprise-Scale Networks
We extended our easy-to-use approach for enrolling
in secure wireless networks to enterprise-class networks
with many access points. We deployed our enterprise so-
lution to handle enrollment in the wireless security sys-
temofasmallenterpriseconsistingofapproximately250
users.
There are two important differences between
enterprise-class networks and the small networks we
have considered previously. First, their architecture is
different – enterprise networks have many access points
communicating with a central backend authentication
infrastructure. Second, enterprise networks have con-
siderably more complex security requirements than are
present in the home.
We address these differences by encapsulating our
gesture-directed enrollment functionality in one or more
“enrollment stations” – usually a simple box, or PC, con-
ﬁgured to allow gesture-directed user authentication over
one or more location-limited channels, but not itself an
access point. Depending on the security needs of the en-
terprise, this enrollment station can implement security
requirements considerably more sophisticated than that
used in the stand-alone case.
By placing the enrollment station in a locked room
to which only employees of the enterprise have access,
one ends up with an intuitive security model very similar
to that used in the stand-alone case. By adding security
cameras monitoring the enrollment station, an enterprise
adds the ability to audit its use after the fact. Or an enter-
prise may want a member of the IT staff to approve each
user enrollment manually, e.g., after checking the user’s
employee badge, or entering additional conﬁguration in-
formation to be added to the enrolling device.
An important design goal for our enterprise solution
is to integrate with existing off-the-shelf commercial de-
vices and software. In our system, the access points, au-
thentication server, and certiﬁcation authority can all be
commercial off-the-shelf, knowing nothing about any of
our conﬁguration protocols. At the same time, we pro-
vide opportunities for system administrator control and
intervention that are desirable in the enterprise setting.
4.1 User Experience
The user experience of enrolling in the enterprise ver-
sion of our system is similar to that of the stand-alone
NiaB system. The user physically brings her new mo-
bile device to one of perhaps many enrollment stations
distributed throughout the enterprise.
A user accessing the enrollment station performs a
brief location-limited exchange, and is then told than an
enrollmentrequesthasbeensubmittedonherbehalf. She
then leaves the enrollment station. As mentioned above,
an IT staff member may want to further review and ap-
prove her request off-line, or perform additional conﬁg-
uration or processing, so it may take some time for her
certiﬁcate request to be fulﬁlled.
All further device conﬁguration takes place over the
wireless network, using any of the enterprise’s access
points. The user does not need to visit the enrollment
station again. She may at will re-run the client enroll-
ment application (possibly prompted by an email from
an administrator) to check whether or not her enrollment
request has been approved; eventually the software indi-
cates that the request has been approved, and the certiﬁ-
cate and conﬁguration information is installed automati-
cally on her device. She may then begin using the secure
wireless network normally.
4.2 System Design
Inthissection, wedescribethechangesindesignfrom
the stand-alone NiaB required to make an enterprise so-
lution (as shown in Figure 5). We separate the com-
ponents built into the stand-alone NiaB AP. The access
points, certiﬁcation authority, and authentication server
functionalities are standard solutions that do not need to
be aware that they are participating in our system. The
enrollment station is designed to handle our EAP-PTLS
protocol and speak with a Certiﬁcation Authority for cer-
tiﬁcate management.
Client Enrollment Software. The client conﬁguration
software is similar to what we use in the stand-alone
NiaB case. The most signiﬁcant change is that the client
software is written to be aware of the fact that a request
for a certiﬁcate may not be approved immediately – wait-
ing for the approval of a system administrator could de-
lay enrollment.
In the stand-alone NiaB system, the Certiﬁcation Au-
thorityeitherimmediatelygrantsorrejectsthecertiﬁcate,Certificate
enrollment station certification authority
access
point
authentication
server
Location-limited
channel exchange
1.
realm proxy
Certificate Request (EAP-PTLS) 2.
Certificate (EAP-PTLS) 5.
6. Secure Wireless (802.1x + EAP-TLS)
Cert Request 3.
4.
Figure 5. Message ﬂows in the enterprise version. Only the enrolling laptop and the “enrollment
station” are aware that they are participating in a NiaB-enabled network.
and the authentication server returns the resulting certiﬁ-
cate or rejection message to the client. In the enterprise
version, however, the certiﬁcate request enters a database
of pending requests that might need to be examined, ap-
proved, or rejected by an administrator.
Becausetheclientandenrollmentstationarespeaking
the Certiﬁcate Management Protocol inside of the EAP-
PTLS tunnel, the enrollment station is able to send to
the client a request number and a result code indicating
that the request is pending. Subsequent execution of the
client enrollment software polls for this request number,
also using CMP messages in the EAP-PTLS tunnel. Un-
til the request has been approved, the client receives an
indication that it is still pending, and can repeat the re-
quest later (see Figure 5).
We note that as long as the server and client cache
the information they exchanged over the location-limited
channel, they do not need to repeat a location-limited ex-
change. These later attempts to retrieve a certiﬁcate that
has already been requested can be performed over the
wireless network without any intervention by the user.
Though the authentication exchange over a location-
limited channel must be done in physical proximity to
the enrollment station, all further interaction with each
client can be done using any access point in the infras-
tructure.
Once approved, the certiﬁcate is returned to the client
the next time the client polls for it; the client enrollment
software automatically conﬁgures the client device to use
the new wireless network just as in the stand-alone case.
Enrollment Station. We conﬁgure the standard off-
the-shelf authentication server to forward EAP-PTLS
trafﬁc to the enrollment station. We accomplish this by
taking advantage of RADIUS proxying (during enroll-
ment the client claims to belong to a recognizable special
realm, “host@preauth”). Authenticated clients then en-
gage in the normal EAP-PTLS enrollment protocol with
the radius server running on the enrollment station, but
the resulting certiﬁcate requests are then forwarded to an
enterprise CA. Since we are using EAP-PTLS, the en-
rollment station does this only for clients it trusts due to
priorinteractionoverthelocation-limitedchannel. When
the client checks to see whether its certiﬁcate has been
issued, its EAP-PTLS exchanges are again forwarded to
the enrollment station, which retrieves the issued certiﬁ-
cate from the enterprise CA.
4.3 Implementation Details
In this section we describe the particular implemen-
tation we are using in our organization; obviously, given
the focus on interoperability with commercial software,
many of these components would vary from installation
to installation.
Access to the wireless network is provided by stan-
dard commercial access points; the Authentication
Server we use is a commercial RADIUS server (Funk
Software’s Steel Belted RadiusTM). This AS is conﬁg-
ured, using standard RADIUS proxying facilities, to for-
ward EAP-PTLS messages from clients requesting en-
rollment in the system to the RADIUS server running on
the enrollment station.Standard Enrollment “Enterprise NiaB” Enrollment
Time (min) Steps Time (min) Steps
Avg 140 38 1:39 4
Ease Satisfaction Conﬁdence Ease Satisfaction Conﬁdence
Avg 54 411 1
Table 2. User studies comparing our “Enterprise NiaB” solution to a typical commercial alter-
native.
For our current deployment, we are using a modiﬁed
stand-alone NiaB as our enrollment station. It runs a
copy of FreeRADIUS that responds to only one EAP
type, namely our EAP-PTLS protocol. It listens for
client authentication requests over location-limited chan-
nels, thus limiting initial requests for enrollment to de-
vices with physical access to the enrollment station. It
matches the authentication information it receives over
these location-limited channels with the public keys used
in requests for PTLS authentications forwarded by the
main Authentication Server.
Our enterprise CA was developed in-house. It is writ-
ten in Java, and provides a web-based interface used by
both people and the EAP-PTLS enrollment protocol to
post certiﬁcation requests. Each certiﬁcate request that
comes in from the NiaB enrollment station must be re-
viewed, edited and approved by a human before the cer-
tiﬁcate is issued. Once the certiﬁcate has been issued,
the user owning the device receives an e-mail message,
indicating that they should re-run the NiaB enrollment
software on their device to retrieve their certiﬁcate and
ﬁnish device conﬁguration. This step can be done at any
physical location within our enterprise.
4.4 Enterprise User Studies
We deployed this software as the primary enrollment
mechanism for our secure enterprise wireless network.
Anecdotally it seemed a success – not only were end
users happier with the process, but our IT staff preferred
to use the system to enroll laptops they were conﬁguring
for other users. To conﬁrm these perceptions, we per-
formed quantitative user studies.
4.4.1 Procedure
In order to see whether our system made enrolling in an
enterprise secure wireless network easier, we undertook
a comparative usability test. Like the stand-alone NiaB
test described in Section 3.4, we wanted to see whether
our enterprise solution was easier to use than a currently
commercially available alternative, described brieﬂy be-
low. We observed ﬁve individuals conducting both types
of enrollment. We followed the same subject selection
protocol as previously described, but although we used
the same subject pool we recruited different subjects for
this second test.
4.4.2 Control – Standard Enterprise Enrollment
We looked at users performing standard procedures for
requesting a digital certiﬁcate, installing that certiﬁ-
cate, and then conﬁguring a standard commercial 802.1x
client to use that certiﬁcate to authenticate to a particu-
lar network. The interface for requesting and installing
certiﬁcates was a web-based one, very similar to that
used by commercial Certiﬁcation Authorities such as
Verisign, or Microsoft’s Certiﬁcate Server software. The
802.1xclientsoftwarewasprovidedwithMicrosoftWin-
dows XPTM, and comes with a dialog-based graphical
conﬁguration interface. Users were provided with exten-
sive documentation as to how to perform all enrollment
and conﬁguration steps, complete with screen shots. The
total procedure required 38 steps.
4.4.3 Results
The results from two iterations of study are shown in Ta-
ble 2. The ﬁrst interesting result was the sheer amount
of time end users took to enroll in the 802.1x-secured
wireless network using the standard interface – an aver-
age of 140 minutes (2 hrs and 20 mins). We found this
result very surprising. This observation underscores the
fact that the intuitions of domain experts – who could
perform the same steps in minutes, if not seconds – are
not always useful in evaluating system usability, and the
importance of obtaining direct feedback about users’ ex-
periences with security systems.
Using our gesture-directed enterprise solution, the
time to enroll dropped dramatically, from 140 minutes
to under 2 minutes. The total number of steps to request
and install a client certiﬁcate and conﬁgure the client de-
vice was reduced from a total of 38 steps to 4 steps. More
signiﬁcantly, users reported making a variety of errors in
the 38-step process, unlike the enrollment procedure of
our enterprise solution, where they made none.The reduction in time and the fact that users did not
make errors contributed to the users’ ratings of ease, sat-
isfaction, and conﬁdence. On scales of 1 (most positive)
to 5 (most negative) users rated ease of task, satisfaction
in the experience, and conﬁdence that they could do it
again more highly for our “enterprise NiaB” wireless en-
rollment system.
4.5 Discussion
While the enterprise version of our system is designed
to meet the fundamental architectural and security con-
straints of almost any corporate network, we have only
been able to experimentally test it in a relatively small
enterprise consisting of about 250 users. It remains to
be seen whether such a system could scale to meet the
demands of a community of 10,000 users supported by a
signiﬁcant IT staff. Traditionally, approaches like ours
are thought inappropriate for enterprise environments:
large enterprises often prefer completely automated con-
ﬁguration approaches without any per-machine interac-
tion. They also usually have all machine conﬁgura-
tion performed by administrators, rather than end users,
thereby potentially putting less of a premium on usabil-
ity.
To counter these arguments, we ﬁrst point out
that the use of certiﬁcate-based authentication meth-
ods and EAP-TLS provides greater security than both
password-based approaches and automatic conﬁguration
approaches without per-device authentication. The lat-
ter approach usually encodes all necessary authentica-
tion information in a static software install replicated on
each machine. This can include things like the certiﬁ-
cate of the access point or authentication server, allowing
one-way authentication of the infrastructure by the client
(which presumably authenticates using a password). In
more dangerous approaches, such installers can include
secretkeyssharedacrossalldevicesinanetwork, oreven
a certiﬁcate and private key for the user.
We ﬁnd this approach unsatisfactory for a number
of reasons. First, it requires the user to download cus-
tomized software for each network they want to join. In
contrast, our client obtains all the information it needs
to conﬁgure a particular network from the AP or enroll-
ment station – it can be re-used to enroll a device in
multiple networks. The fact that our client software is
“generic” in this way means that it could be pre-installed
by an operating system vendor, without requiring further
customization for a particular network. Second, blindly
downloading enrollment information or keys to a poten-
tial new client in a customized installer may make it eas-
ier to conﬁgure that client to use a network, but it doesn’t
solve the fundamental trust assignment problem – au-
thenticating that a particular device ought to be in fact
the one to receive those keys. At best, this problem can
be sidestepped by requiring that client to authenticate us-
ing a previously-existing password infrastructure. Our
goal was to allow easy, secure enrollment in a wireless
network even in the case where no pre-existing trust in-
frastructure existed.
Our approach can also be very appealing even in en-
terprises where all new machines are initially conﬁgured
by an administrator. First, we ﬁnd anecdotally that even
the experienced systems administrators in the small en-
terprise in which we deployed our system vastly pre-
ferred to use it to conﬁgure new devices for other users
than the previous, manual option. Given the increas-
ing demands on administrators and the fact that many
of them are not security experts, increased usability of
security can be valuable to them as well.
Second, in large organizations, administrative tasks
such as WLAN enrollment will happen repeatedly over
the lifespan of a given device – returning it to an adminis-
trator every time is inconvenient. Increasingly, users in-
troduce personal devices, such as PDAs, into their work-
place. System administrators do not have the time and
facilities to conﬁgure each device that an employee may
need to use at work. In all of these cases, it may be easier
to have employees enroll their own devices into a wire-
less network as needed, rather than expecting them to be
preconﬁgured by an administrator.
5 Related Work
The use of a gesture-based user interface to commu-
nicate a small piece of information for bootstrapping a
larger data exchange is a relatively recent idea. In re-
sponse to increasing realization that ubiquitous comput-
ing will demand that users select among many comput-
ers around them, systems such as gesturePen [37] have
used infrared-based pointing mechanisms to allow users
to select desired targets. The role of gesturePen is to
help users establish data communications with comput-
ers around them, and the infrared channel is used to ex-
change IP address information. Our work relies on the
same intuitive user experience as gesturePen, but builds
on it by providing a secure information exchange.
Gesture-based user interfaces have also found other
applications, some with security in mind [5, 30], some
without [19]. To our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to ap-
ply this idea to provide a complete solution for securing
wireless 802.11 networks.
The idea of location-limited channels originated in
[35] (although not under that name). In [5], this idea
was expanded to use public key cryptography, enabling a
much wider range of potential types of location-limited
channels. The list of possible location-limited channels,
and their uses, continues to expand [20, 21, 30].Our system reduces network security to the physical
security at the time of enrollment – a simple, intuitive
model accessible to non-technically-savvy users. This
is in contrast to Microsoft’s CHOICE network [25] and
the Secure Wireless Gateway (SWG) [14], which do not
require physical proximity, but are much harder to use.
For example, in Microsoft’s CHOICE network, users en-
ter an existing Passport password into a web page every
time they want to use a public wireless network. The
SWG asks a user to log in to a secure web site using an
existing password and execute additional conﬁguration
steps. While entering a password may not seem like a
burden, adding seemingly simple steps like this actually
has large impact for non-technically-savvy users [10].
Furthermore, gesture-based automatic conﬁguration can
be used with a wide variety of embedded devices that
may not allow users to enter passwords.
Both SWG and Microsoft CHOICE require the user
to have an existing trust relationship with the network
provider, while our approach allows mutual authentica-
tion between users and network providers that share no
preexisting relationship. We also point out that our sys-
tem conveys all of the security advantages of using dig-
ital certiﬁcates in a Public Key Infrastructure. This is
in contrast to SWG, which secures wireless access using
IPSec conﬁgured with a shared secret.
The perceived difﬁculties associated with managing
Public Key Infrastructures often lead users to look for
other, less secure alternatives. There has been some
work, however, to make PKIs more usable (see, for ex-
ample, [15]). The location-limited channels we use al-
low us to side-step much of the bootstrapping problems
usually found when trying to build a global Public-Key
Infrastructure. We also show with our work that one can
quite effectively use a “small-scale” PKI without inherit-
ing the usability problems usually associated with larger
PKIs.
6 Conclusions
Security and usability are typically thought to be at
odds with each other: highly secure systems are thought
to be necessarily difﬁcult to use, and systems that can be
easily managed by end users are thought to be inherently
insecure. Yet deploying systems of mobile devices, in
which ease of administration and security are both press-
ing concerns, requires a resolution to this apparent con-
ﬂict. We have demonstrated, by way of example, that
security and usability are not always irreconcilable. Our
“Network-in-a-Box” system provides an example of how
gesture-based user interfaces can lead to systems that are
both secure and easy to use.
We have implemented our NiaB system, both in a
stand-alone and an enterprise version, to test out our de-
sign. Through user studies, we experimentally measured
a signiﬁcant decrease in the time required by users to set
up a secure wireless network as compared to a typical
commercial access point. This improvement – from ap-
proximately ten minutes down to under a minute – is es-
pecially favorable when one notes that our solution sets
up the highly secure 802.1x/EAP-TLS standard, versus
the signiﬁcantly less secure password-based WEP stan-
dard used by the commercial access point.
Our approach, gesture-directed automatic conﬁgura-
tion, relates digital security to physical security in a way
that users ﬁnd intuitively easy to understand. Although
we have applied this technique to address the particularly
pressing problem of securing 802.11 wireless networks,
the approach is quite general and can be used to design
a variety of systems that are both secure and easy to ad-
minister.
7 Acknowledgments
We like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Tim
Diebert for their helpful comments. Alp Simsek built the
“phone home” service described Section 3.2.2. Raghu
Gopalanprovidedvaluablefeedbackaboutourenterprise
deployment.
References
[1] B. Aboba and D. Simon. PPP EAP TLS Authentication
Protocol (EAP-TLS). IETF - Network Working Group,
The Internet Society, October 1999. RFC 2716.
[2] Wi-Fi Protected Access. WPA. http:
//www.wifialliance.org/opensection/
protected_access.asp.
[3] C. Adams and S. Farrell. Internet X.509 Public Key Infas-
tructure Certiﬁcate Management Protocols. IETF - Net-
work Working Group, The Internet Society, March 1999.
RFC 2510.
[4] N. Asokan, V. Niemi, and K. Nyberg. Man-in-the-middle
in tunnelled authentication protocols. In 11th Security
Protocols Workshop, Cambridge, United Kingdom, April
2003. Springer-Verlag.
[5] Dirk Balfanz, D.K. Smetters, Paul Stewart, and H. Chi
Wong. Talking to strangers: Authentication in ad-hoc
wireless networks. In Proceedings of the 2002 Network
and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS’02),
San Diego, CA, February 2002. The Internet Society.
[6] L. Blunk and J. Vollbrecht. PPP Extensible Authentica-
tion Protocol (EAP). IETF - Network Working Group,
The Internet Society, March 1998. RFC 2284.
[7] Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner. In-
tercepting mobile communications: The insecurity of
802.11, 2001.[8] P. Congdon, B. Aboba, A. Smith, G. Zorn, and J. Roese.
IEEE 802.1x Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines. IETF - Network Working
Group, The Internet Society, September 2003. RFC 3580.
[9] T. Dierks and C. Allen. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0.
IETF - Network Working Group, The Internet Society,
January 1999. RFC 2246.
[10] Joseph S. Dumas and Janice C. Redish. A Practical Guide
to Usability Testing. Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993.
[11] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir. Weaknesses in the
key scheduling algorithm of RC4. In Eight Annual Work-
shop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, August 2001.
[12] Wireless Tools for Linux. http://www.hpl.hp.
com/personal/Jean_Tourrilhes/Linux/
Tools.html.
[13] TheOpenBrick Foundation. OpenBrick. http://www.
openbrick.org/.
[14] Austin Godber and Partha Dasgupta. Secure wireless
gateway. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wire-
less Security (WiSe-02), pages 41–46, NewYork, Septem-
ber 28 2002. ACM Press.
[15] Peter Gutmann. Plug-and-play PKI: A PKI your mother
can use. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium, pages 45–58, Washington, D.C., August
2003.
[16] The Cable Guy. Windows XP wireless auto conﬁgura-
tion. www.microsoft.com/technet/columns/
cableguy/cg1102.asp, November 2002.
[17] IEEE. ANSI/IEEE. 802.1x: Port-based network access
control, 2001.
[18] IEEE. ANSI/IEEE. 802.11i: MAC enhancements for en-
hanced security, 2003.
[19] Tim Kindberg, John Barton, Jeff Morgan, Gene Becker,
Debbie Caswell, Philippe Debaty, Gita Gopal, Mar-
cos Frid, Venky Krishnan, Howard Morris, Celine Per-
ing, John Schettino, Bill Serra, and Mirjana Spasojevic.
Places and things: Web presence for the real world. In
3rd IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and
Applications (WMCSA 2000), 2000.
[20] Tim Kindberg and Kan Zhang. Secure spontaneous de-
vice association. In UbiComp 2003, 2003.
[21] Tim Kindberg and Kan Zhang. Validating and securing
spontaneous associations between wireless devices. In
Proceedings of the 6th Information Security Conference
(ISC03), 2003.
[22] The Dumb Networking Library. libdnet. http://
libdnet.sourceforge.net/.
[23] The Packet Capture Library. libpcap. http://www.
tcpdump.org/.
[24] C. Lopes and P. Aguiar. Aerial acoustic communications.
In Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Applica-
tions of Signal Processing to Audio and Acoustics,N e w
Paltz, NY, October 2001.
[25] Microsoft. The CHOICE network. http://www.
mschoice.com/.
[26] Jakob Nielsen and Thomas K. Landauer. A mathematical
model of the ﬁnding of usability problems. In ACM Con-
ference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (IN-
TERCHI ’93), pages 206–213, 1993.
[27] Open Source Implementation of IEEE 802.1x. xsuppli-
cant. http://www.open1x.org/.
[28] The FreeRADIUS Server Project. FreeRADIUS. http:
//www.freeradius.org/.
[29] The HostAP Project. HostAP. http://hostap.
epitest.fi/.
[30] Jun Rekimoto, Yuji Ayatsuka, Michimune Kohno, and
Hauro Oba. Proximal interactions: A direct manipula-
tion technique for wireless networking. In Proceedings of
INTERACT 2003, 2003.
[31] C. Rigney, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, and S. Willens.
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS).
IETF - Network Working Group, The Internet Society,
June 2000. RFC 2865.
[32] Robert Moskowitz. Weakness in passphrase choice in
WPA interface, 2003.
[33] Acme Software. mini httpd. http://www.acme.
com/software/mini_httpd/.
[34] Network Driver Interface Speciﬁcation. NDIS. http:
//www.ndis.com/.
[35] Frank Stajano and Ross J. Anderson. The resurrecting
duckling: Security issues for ad-hoc wireless networks.
In 7th Security Protocols Workshop, volume 1796 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 172–194, Cam-
bridge, United Kingdom, 1999. Springer-Verlag, Berlin
Germany.
[36] Adam Stubbleﬁeld, John Ioannidis, and Aviel D. Ru-
bin. Using the Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack to
Break WEP. In Proceedings of the 2002 Network and
Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS’02), San
Diego, CA, February 2002. The Internet Society.
[37] Colin Swindells, Kori M. Inkpen, John C. Dill, and
Melanie Tory. That onethere! pointingto establishdevice
identity. In ACM Conference on User Interface Software
and Technology (UIST 2002), pages 151–160, 2002.
[38] W. Townsley. Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP).
IETF - Network Working Group, The Internet Society,
December 2002. RFC 3438.